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THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL/DOMESTIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP: 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR TUSHNET 
David Fontana?
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II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
A.  A Transnational Law Constitutional Moment?
B.  Transnational Law in Constitutional Interpretation
III. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS BINDING LAW
A.  Federalism Concerns
B.  Sovereignty Concerns
IV.  CONCLUSION
? J.D. expected, Yale University; D.Phil. expected, Oxford University; B.A., 
University of Virginia.  My thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Galoob, Paul 
Horwitz, A.E. Dick Howard, Vicki C. Jackson, Paul Kahn, Vasan Kesavan, 
Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Nickolai Levin, Matthew Lindsay, Gerard 
Magliocca, Jeffrey Manns, Jerry Mashaw, Judith Resnik, John Rich, Louis 
Michael Seidman, Kate Stith, Mark Tushnet, and Howard Wasserman for 
helpful comments and discussions on this and related issues.  The author also 
thanks the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for giving me the 
opportunity to write this Reply.  I expand in greater detail on some of my 
arguments in this piece in two other places: David Fontana, Refined
Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001), and in a 
work in progress tentatively entitled Refined Comparativism Five Years Later.  
It should be noted that the writing of this piece was mostly completed in the 
Fall of 2004.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mark Tushnet is one of the new breed of American public law 
scholars.  He has written widely and notably on a range of American 
domestic law subjects, from the civil rights movement1 to 
constitutional theory.2  He has also written on a range of topics 
related to comparative constitutional law,3 and he has consistently 
integrated what he has learned4 from writing about other countries 
into his writings on the American constitutional condition.5
1. E.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATION, 1925–1950 (1987); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1987). 
2. E.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 
3. E.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Alternate Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003); Mark V. 
Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L. J.
11 (2000); Mark V. Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some 
Cautionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649
(2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, Cautionary Notes]; Mark V. Tushnet, Marbury v. 
Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2004); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895
(2004); Mark V. Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial 
Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435 (2002); Mark V. 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J.
1225 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Possibilities].
4. See generally Tushnet, Cautionary Notes, supra note 3 (identifying 
reasons for caution about the use of transnational law in interpreting domestic 
constitutions); Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 3 (analyzing three distinct 
ways that comparing the constitutional experiences of other nations may assist 
with our interpretations of the U.S. Constitution).  Tushnet is not the only 
major contemporary scholar who uses this “integrated” approach to 
scholarship, fusing the domestic and the foreign.  His colleague Vicki C. 
Jackson is another example of someone who writes “integrated” scholarship.  
For examples of her writings on domestic subjects, see, for instance, Vicki C. 
Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 229; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Baker and Our Bifurcated Constitution,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh 
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 495 (1997).  For examples of her writings using the integrated approach, 
see, for instance, JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 3; Vicki C. Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the 
Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 583 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: 
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Perhaps because he has so seamlessly integrated the 
transnational and domestic, Professor Tushnet understates many of 
the serious objections to this integrative approach in his essay, 
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law.6  At the same time, 
while Professor Tushnet understates many of the legitimate 
objections to integrating transnational law into our law, these 
States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 
(2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and Transnational Legal Discourse, 14 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, 
Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
265 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and 
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223 (2001); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: 
Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Yes 
Please, I’d Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 43 
[hereinafter Jackson, Yes Please].
  Bruce Ackerman is another example of a scholar who uses this 
integrated approach.  He has written many notable pieces on domestic 
constitutional law.  E.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
Ackerman has also written on comparative and international matters, most 
recently in the context of the lessons we may gleam from the experiences of 
other countries with states of emergency.  Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029–62 (2004) (looking to the experiences of 
Canada, Germany, India, Poland, Rome, Russia, and South Africa regarding 
states of emergency). 
5. Indeed, we may wonder whether this “new breed” of integrated scholars 
are simply picking up where scholars generations ago left off, but where their 
successors failed to follow.  For instance, consider that Roscoe Pound was a 
prolific scholar of comparative law.  The first year that he taught law, at the 
University of Nebraska in 1899, Pound taught Roman Law, Comparative Law, 
and History of English Law.  See PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND 
143 (1948).  Four years later, Pound was writing that jurisprudence “might be 
called: the comparative anatomy of developed systems of law.”  1 ROSCOE 
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, at iv (1959).  In the 1950s, Pound was the president 
of the Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé.  His landmark book on 
jurisprudence focused substantially on foreign law. Roscoe Pound, 
Comparative Law in the Formation of American Common Law, in 1 ACTORUM 
ACADEMIAE UNIVERSIALIS IURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE 183, 197 
(Elmer Balogh ed. 1928); see also Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative 
Law in the American Law School Curriculum, 8 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1934) 
(discussing how to integrate comparative law studies into the law school 
curriculum).  See generally David Fontana, The Pervasive Method in 
American Law Schools, Law Firms and Law Courts (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (arguing for a revitalization of Pound’s approach). 
6. See Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239 (2003). 
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objections should not be considered fatal to the “integrative 
approach” (integrating domestic and transnational7 constitutional 
law).  The best approach, as this Reply will briefly discuss, is to 
consider the arguments against the integrative approach neither to be 
superfluous, nor determinative.  Rather, the new generation of 
integrative scholarship should recognize that these criticisms have 
their merits, but also that integrative activities are here to stay.  We 
need to move beyond “all or nothing” scholarship on this topic and 
find a way to create a principled system of integrative activities.  
Consequently, the best way forward is to begin considering how to 
create a world where the domestic and foreign are integrated, but 
integrated in the optimal manner. 
This Reply discusses this potential new generation of integrative 
scholarship in the context of the two areas that Professor Tushnet 
discusses: Transnational law as merely persuasive authority that 
courts may choose to follow when they engage in constitutional 
interpretation, and transnational law as binding authority that 
American courts8 must follow.9 In his discussion of transnational law 
as persuasive authority, Professor Tushnet overstates the importance 
of the current moment, but understates the serious concerns that 
many may have with using transnational law as persuasive authority 
and the distinctiveness of these concerns from general debates about 
constitutional interpretation.10  In his discussion of transnational law 
as binding authority, Professor Tushnet too easily dismisses the valid 
federalism and sovereignty concerns that integration skeptics have 
presented.11
7. For the purposes of this Reply, “transnational law” refers to 
comparative law (i.e. the domestic law of foreign countries) and international 
law (the law among nation-states). 
8. Tushnet has been one of the leading pioneers of studying the 
Constitution outside of the courts.  E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). Given that fact, it is curious that he does not 
examine transnational law outside of the courts, and whether the arguments he 
makes are solely limited to the intersection of the domestic and the 
transnational in the courts. 
9. This Reply discusses these two areas in the contexts of the arguments 
that Tushnet makes, but also extends slightly beyond Tushnet’s arguments to 
address some general issues raised by these two areas of integrative activity. 
10. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 239–46. 
11. Id.
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II. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
Tushnet first discusses the role of transnational law as 
persuasive authority.12  Persuasive authority is authority that courts 
need not follow, but may consult if they feel it will be helpful.13  As 
Patrick Glenn defined it, persuasive authority is “authority which 
attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it.”14  Tushnet focuses on 
the use of transnational law as persuasive authority by focusing on 
“recent references in U.S. Supreme Court opinions to constitutional 
developments in other jurisdictions, and the critiques of those 
references from within the Court.”15  Tushnet makes two central 
claims about the role of transnational law as persuasive authority. 
First, Tushnet seems to argue16 that the developments of the past 
several years mark some sort of “transnational constitutional 
moment,”17 bringing the idea of transnational law as persuasive 
12. Id. at 241. 
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (8th ed. 1999). 
14. H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 
(1987).  For my earlier discussion of persuasive authority in the context of 
transnational law, see David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional 
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 557–59 (2001).
15. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 240. 
16. Tushnet’s argument about the use of transnational law as persuasive 
authority is a little less stark and explicit than his argument about the use of 
transnational law as binding authority, but his piece does include some text that 
makes this seem like a particularly important moment for transnational law as 
persuasive authority.  See id. at 241 (“Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, no recent 
Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-
constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to the majority’s 
analysis.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 244 (“The current Court’s first use of non-
U.S. law to support a position relevant to its disposition came in Lawrence v. 
Texas . . . .”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III., The Use of International Law in 
Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 423, 424 (2004) (“As
Professor Mark Tushnet has recognized, never before in our history has the 
Court relied so directly on foreign precedents to support a position material to 
the Court’s holding.” (citing Tushnet, supra, note 6)).  But see Tushnet, supra
note 6, at 245 (“It is important not to exaggerate the degree of controversy 
manifested on the Supreme Court.”).
17. This phrase is obviously a reformulation of Bruce Ackerman’s 
discussion of “constitutional moments,” or moments when there were 
significant changes in the domestic constitutional order. 1 ACKERMAN, supra
note 4, passim; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, passim. It is also a reformulation 
of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s use of the phrase “international constitutional 
moment[s]” to describe moments when there are major changes in the 
international constitutional regime.  Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-
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authority to the center of public and scholarly attention for the first 
time.18  Second, Tushnet argues that this debate about the integrative 
approach is not really about transnational law, but is instead about 
larger questions of constitutional interpretation, with the appropriate 
role of transnational law simply being the particular application of 
these larger debates.
A.  A Transnational Law Constitutional Moment? 
Tushnet seems to argue19 that this is a major moment for the use 
of transnational law as persuasive authority.  In Lawrence v. Texas,20
decided two years ago, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an opinion 
for the Court invalidating a Texas law criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy law as violating substantive due process.21  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion cited to earlier European statements on 
homosexuality to disprove a statement in an earlier Supreme Court 
opinion that condemnation of homosexual conduct was universal.22
Justice Kennedy also discussed transnational law as a means of 
assessing the gravity of the liberty interest involved, and of 
determining whether the statute at issue furthered any permissible 
state goals.23 Tushnet argues that “[p]rior to Lawrence v. Texas, no 
recent Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or 
para-constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to 
the majority’s analysis”24 and later asserts that “[t]he current Court’s 
first use of non-U.S. law to support a position relevant to its 
disposition came in Lawrence v. Texas.”25
White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 
(2002). 
18. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241. 
19. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
20. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
21. Id. at 578. 
22. Id. at 571 (citing to Chief Justice Burger’s statement in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), that “[d]ecisions of individuals relating 
to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the 
history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly 
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards”).
23. Id. at 577 (“The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted 
as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been 
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing 
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).
24. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241. 
25. Id. at 244. 
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In many ways, Tushnet is right to note how important Lawrence
was for transnational law.  Lawrence involved constitutional 
questions surrounding a politically controversial issue, 
homosexuality, so it was sure to gain attention, thereby ensuring that 
its discussion of transnational law was also sure to gain much 
attention.  The Court also issued the Lawrence opinion on the last 
day that the Court was releasing opinions from its 2002 Term,26 so a 
great amount of public attention was already focused on the Court.  
Coupled with the use of transnational law in Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger27—another case 
involving politically controversial issues and issued during the last 
week of the 2002 Term28—perhaps the Court was self-consciously 
trying to draw attention to its use of transnational law.  Not 
surprisingly, then, these uses of transnational law received wide 
attention in the popular press,29 and eventually even led the House of 
Representatives to consider impeaching federal judges for 
referencing transnational law.30 In terms of the life of the 
26. See 539 U.S. at 558 (decided June 26, 2003); see, Supreme Court 
Calendar October Term 2002, at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/ 
supreme_court/calendar/calendar.2002.html. 
27. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing to 
international conventions as reflecting “the international understanding of the 
office of affirmative action”). 
28. See id. at 306 (decided June 23, 2003). 
29. See, e.g., Tony H. Mauro, Court Shows Interest in International Law,
N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2003, at 1; H. Rubenstein, International Law’s New 
Importance In The U.S., NAT’L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 16; Quin Hillyer, 
Constitutional Irrelevance, NAT’L REV., July 7, 2003, http://www 
.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-hillyer070703.asp; David A. Keene, 
Justices: When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do, HILL, Jul. 15, 2003; Jacob
Levy, Foreign Invasion, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Nov. 12, 2003), at
https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=scholar&s=levy111203.
30. Representative Tom Feeney, a Republican from Florida, proposed a 
resolution in the House of Representatives that “judicial determinations 
regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should  
not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions.”  
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H. Res. 568, at
http://www.house.gov/feeney/downloads/reaffirm/feeney008.pdf (May 7, 
2004).  Representative Feeney indicated in an interview that: 
This resolution advises the courts that it is improper for them to 
substitute foreign law for American law or the American 
Constitution. . . . To the extent they deliberately ignore Congress’ 
admonishment, they are no longer engaging in ‘good behavior’ in the 
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Constitution outside of the courts for persuasive authority, this was a 
transnational law constitutional moment. 
As a doctrinal matter, though, I question Professor Tushnet’s 
claim that Lawrence’s use of transnational law was revolutionary.  
Tushnet argues that this was the first time that a “recent Supreme 
Court decision”31 or “[t]he current Court[]”32 used transnational law 
as a part of the majority opinion.  However, in Atkins v. Virginia,33
the 2002 case invalidating executions of mentally retarded criminals 
for violating the Eighth Amendment, Justice John Paul Stevens 
incorporated transnational law into part of the majority opinion.34
Justice Stevens examined various sources and determined that there 
was a consensus against the permissibility of such executions, and 
that such executions therefore violated the Eighth Amendment.35
One of these sources was transnational law: 
Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative 
judgment reflects a much broader social and professional 
consensus. For example, several organizations with 
germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing 
the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded 
offender.  In addition, representatives of widely diverse 
religious communities in the United States, reflecting 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions, have 
meaning of the Constitution and they may subject themselves to the 
ultimate remedy, which would be impeachment. 
Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/4506232 (March 11, 2004) (statement of Rep. Tom 
Feeney).
31. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241. 
32. Id. at 244. Notice that these two statements are different (not 
inconsistent, but different): Tushnet first remarks that “no recent . . . decision” 
has used transnational law as part of the analysis of the majority.  Id. at 241 
(emphasis added).  Tushnet later states that this is the first time that the 
“current Court” has done this.  Id. at 244 (emphasis added).  If recent means 
the ten years since Justice Stephen Breyer joined the Court to make it “this” 
Court, then these two statements mean exactly the same thing, but it is not 
entirely clear that this is what Tushnet intends his statements to mean. 
33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
34. Id. at 316 n.21. 
35. Id. at 307 (referencing “[t]he consensus reflected in . . . deliberations” 
among a variety of institutions and sources as the reason for holding that 
executing mentally retarded individuals violates “the Eighth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution”). 
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filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even though 
their views about the death penalty differ, they all “share a 
conviction that the execution of persons with mental 
retardation cannot be morally justified.” 
Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of 
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. Brief for 
European Union as Amicus Curiae 4. Finally, polling data 
shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even 
those who support the death penalty, that executing the 
mentally retarded is wrong.  Although these factors are by 
no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative 
evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there 
is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.36
Granted, this language appears only in a footnote, but this footnote is 
still part of the majority opinion, a majority opinion joined by five 
other members of the Court in its entirety.  Even Justice Scalia 
writing in dissent took this language seriously, arguing with “the
Court’s . . . [e]ffort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ [by looking to] 
members of the so-called ‘world community.’”37
Depending on what Tushnet means by “recent,” we can also find 
many other examples of “recent” Supreme Court decisions 
referencing transnational law in majority opinions.38 In this past 
term, in Schriro v. Summerlin,39 Justice Scalia referenced the 
experience of foreign countries with judge trials as part of his 
argument about the relative differences of judge versus jury trials,40
and this reference was part of the majority opinion about the 
importance of Ring v. Arizona41 for future parties.42 In the majority 
opinion in Raines v. Byrd,43 the Court noted that other countries used 
a standing system similar to one the Court was considering, making 
36. Id. at 316 n.21 (emphasis added) (except as noted, citations omitted). 
37. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
38. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004); Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997). 
39. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004). 
40. Id. at 2525. 
41. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
42. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525. 
43. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
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such a system not totally irrational.44 Transnational law has also been 
referenced in less central parts of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions.45
Another reason why, as a doctrinal matter, Lawrence was not 
revolutionary:  If we look beyond recent times, we can find 
numerous examples of references to transnational law,46 often as part 
44. Id. at 828. 
45. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (discussing “international views on [the] detention of refugees”); 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (discussing the jurisprudence regarding freedom of speech in the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Knight v. 
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (mentioning decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court of 
India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Canadian Supreme Court, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
instructive); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (looking to the treatment of federalism issues in Switzerland, 
Germany, and the European Union); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
785–87 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (examining the Dutch 
experience with euthanasia); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 
334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Australian, Canadian, and 
English legal regulations of campaign speech); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 
906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (examining the 
relevant experiences of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West 
Germany, and Zimbabwe). 
46. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mentioning judicial 
decisions discussing the right to life by the West German Constitutional Court 
and the Canadian Supreme Court); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 443 
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (making reference to a state court opinion 
referring to suspicionless searches as techniques used by “Hitler’s Berlin”); 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(studying the experiences of other countries with “totalitarian regimes”); Metro 
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(examining race-conscious regimes in Nazi Germany and South Africa); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (plurality opinion) 
(looking to the capital punishment practices of “nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage, and [of] the leading members of the Western European 
community”); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the Nuremberg 
Tribunals); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (White, J., 
plurality opinion) (noting that “[i]t is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty 
for rape where death did not ensue”); Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 
924, 926–27 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that American 
constitutional protections for freedom of speech differentiate this country from 
totalitarian countries); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
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of majority opinions issued by earlier Supreme Courts,47 even 
94, 158 n.9 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing Brazil’s “present 
regime of censorship”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764–65 (1971) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing the doctrinal approach of the majority that 
used by the “totalitarian countries”); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 
(1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (looking to doctrinal 
trends “throughout the world”); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (looking at “common understanding[s] throughout the 
English-speaking world” regarding privacy); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 408 
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (comparing American judicial review with 
judicial review in other federal systems around the world); Romero v. Int’l 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (granting federal maritime 
jurisdiction while noting that “[s]uch a system is not an inherent requirement 
of a federal government”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing a “poignant” argument for 
academic freedom in South Africa); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (analyzing the role of freedom of speech 
in the constitutional order in other democracies); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 189 (1951) (Reed, J., dissenting) (studying 
the actions taken by other democracies to “control disloyalty among 
government employees”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1951) 
(Black, J., concurring) (noting the use in Argentina of congressional 
investigations to attack dissident newspapers); Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (examining the standards of 
decency “in a civilized society”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413–14 
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]he safeguards of ‘due 
process of law’ and the ‘equal protection of the laws’ summarize the history of 
freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and 
reflected in the constitutional development of our people”); United States v. 
Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 198 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(discussing elements of Canadian federalism); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 304 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (upholding the ability of 
states to regulate certain family law issues, despite different practices in 
foreign systems); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that the intergovernmental tax 
immunity case before the Court raises the “same legal issues” as in Australia 
and Canada under provisions of their constitutional acts). 
47. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 507–08 n.6 (1990) (“[The] 
courts might find guidance in . . . the opinions of South African tribunals, and 
in the precedents of Nazi Germany.”) (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the 
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 191–92 (1989)); Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“[T]he totalitarian state[s] in 
our own times . . . have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of 
the state.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) (discussing 
the experiences of England, India, Canada, and a “number of other 
Commonwealth countries”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 
(1977) (stating that “[t]he right of personal security is . . . ‘enshrined in the 
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sometimes opinions from more than half a century ago,48 and several 
times as part of majority opinions in landmark cases.  Consider two 
wonderful examples.  In Miranda v. Arizona,49 the Court devoted 
several pages of the majority opinion to the analysis of lessons from 
overseas regarding the warnings to be provided to potential criminal 
history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples’”) 
(quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949)); Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 353 (1976) (noting that the patronage system was associated with the 
rise to power of the Nazi regime); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) 
(finding that the phrase “crimes against nature” has been in use among 
“English-speaking people” for many centuries); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
103 (1958) (noting that only two of eighty-four countries surveyed used 
“denationalization as a penalty for desertion”); Quinn v. United States, 349 
U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (noting that prosecution rules regarding contempt of 
Congress in the United States are “supported by long-standing tradition here 
and in other English-speaking nations”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 
(1953) (Frankfruter, J., concurring) (claiming that the availability of the writ of 
habeas corpus is “one of the decisively differentiating factors between our 
democracy and totalitarian governments”). 
48. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 (1949) (noting the views “[o]f 10 
jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth of 
Nations”); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The right to speak 
freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the 
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”); New York v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946) (noting the barrenness of the 
proprietary and governmental distinction in other federal systems for purposes 
of intergovernmental tax immunity); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 
226, 234 (1945) (holding that domicile for constitutional purposes should be 
treated as “an historic notion common to all English-speaking courts”); W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“[The u]ltimate futility of 
such attempts to compel coherence [of sentiment] is the lesson of every such 
effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity . . . , the Inquisition . . . , 
the Siberian exiles . . . , down to the fast failing efforts of our present 
totalitarian enemies.”); O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 nn.6 & 8, 
282 n.9 (1939) (examining the experience of other countries in determining 
that the imposition of an income tax on judges’ salaries was constitutional); 
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (concluding that 
the Constitution embodies “‘only relatively fundamental rules of right, as 
generally understood by all English-speaking communities’” (quoting Otis v. 
Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903))); Harriman v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 419 (1908) (stating that the power to require testimony 
is usually limited “in English-speaking countries”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar 
v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (“The decisions of the Courts of 
every country . . . will be received, not as authority, but with respect.”). 
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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suspects.50  In Roe v. Wade,51 Justice Blackmun looked to the 
regulations of other countries regarding abortion.52
It is not so clear, then, that Lawrence was revolutionary, and 
indeed it is not absolutely clear that Tushnet is right when he says 
that “references to non-U.S. constitutional law have become more 
frequent in recent years than they had been in decades from 1960 to 
1990.”53 Instead, it would be more accurate to say we have had a 
Court that has paid at least some attention to transnational law for a 
long time, and many people are just now noticing.54
B.  Constitutional Interpretation and Transnational Law 
As part of his general argument that the controversies about the 
intersection of domestic and transnational law are not terribly 
important, Tushnet claims that there is no unique debate about using 
transnational law.  Instead, he believes that: 
[T]he real disagreement . . . [is] not about the relevance of 
non-U.S. law to constitutional interpretation in general . . . 
but [is] rather about the proper approach to interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution . . . .55
I have two concerns with this argument:  First, I do not think there 
are fundamental disagreements anymore about the relevance of 
transnational law, so the core debate about its relevance that Tushnet 
references simply does not exist.56  Second, Justice Scalia and others 
50. Id. at 436–40.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
52. Id. at 129–30. 
53. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245.
54. This does not mean that the Court has cited to transnational law as 
much as one might like, but it still means that transnational law has been a part 
of the Court’s agenda for some time, even though no one has noticed.  See id.
at 239 (“[A]t least in the past, the U.S. Supreme Court paid attention to at least 
some aspects of foreign constitutional law . . . .”). 
55. Id. at 241–42. 
56. To be fair, this statement is based to a good degree on several cases 
decided after Tushnet finished writing his article.  When Tushnet wrote his 
piece, the language from Justice Scalia about transnational law, found in his 
opinion in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2525 (2004), was not yet 
available, nor had Justice Scalia yet given his speech on transnational law to 
the American Society of International Law.  Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreign 
Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address to the American 
Society of International Law, (Apr. 2, 2004) in 98 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC.
305 (2004). 
DAVID_FONTANA_PRINTREADY_032405.DOC 3/28/2005 9:50:58 AM
114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn 
have raised legitimate concerns—independent of general debates 
about constitutional interpretation—about how precisely to use 
transnational law.57  Although these concerns have been presented as 
if they defeat the entire enterprise of using transnational law as an 
interpretive tool, in reality we should read them as setting up the 
debate about how exactly we are going to use transnational law. 
First, everyone seems to agree that transnational law should be 
used by American courts interpreting constitutional text,58 so 
Tushnet is wrong in assuming that there is a debate about first 
principles at all.59  Those generally considered to be “conservative[]” 
have been identified as the most resistant to the use of transnational 
law.60  Conservative academics, although they testified in favor of 
the Feeney Resolution when the House of Representatives 
considered it,61 have conceded that transnational law can be used in 
many situations.62  Even Judge Richard Posner,63 for instance, has 
argued in favor of the use of transnational law: 
57. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241–42. 
58. See infra notes 64–110 and accompanying text. 
59. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245. 
60. See, e.g., id. (identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia 
and Thomas as those who oppose the use of transnational law); see also Knight 
v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari) (arguing that if “there [were] any [tradition or precedent] in our own 
jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary” to look to transnational law); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (“[C]omparative analysis [is] 
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course 
quite relevant to the task of writing one.”).
61. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of 
American Law: Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) 
(statement of Prof. John O. McGinnis, Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ.) 
[hereinafter McGinnis testimony], available at http://www.house.gov/ 
judiciary/mcginnis032504.pdf.; id. (statement of Prof. Jeremy Rabkin, 
Professor of Law, Cornell Univ.) [hereinafter Rabkin testimony], available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/rabkin032504.htm; id. (statement of Prof. 
Michael D. Ramsey, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Law School) 
[hereinafter Ramsey testimony] (noting that Lawrence did not cite to countries 
that did criminalize homosexual sodomy), available at http://www 
.house.gov/judiciary/ramsey032504.pdf. 
62. McGinnis testimony, supra note 61, at 5 (“[F]oreign law could be 
relevant to prove a fact about the world which is relevant to the law.”); Ramsey 
testimony, supra note 61, at 1 (“Foreign materials are relevant to the 
interpretation of U.S. law in numerous circumstances.”).  But see Rabkin 
testimony, supra note 61 (noting strong objections to using transnational law); 
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It was not irrelevant, from a pragmatic standpoint, to the 
outcome of Brown v. Board of Education that official racial 
segregation had been abolished outside the South and bore a 
disturbing resemblance to Nazi racial laws . . . . If I were 
writing an opinion invalidating the life sentence in my 
hypothetical marijuana case I would look at the 
punishments for this conduct in other states and in the 
foreign countries, such as England and France, that we 
consider in some sense our peers. If a law could be said to 
be contrary to world public opinion I would consider this a 
reason, not compelling but not negligible either, for 
regarding a state law as unconstitutional even if the 
Constitution’s text had to be stretched a bit to cover it. The 
study of other laws, or of world public opinion as 
crystallized in foreign law and practices, is a more 
profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenth-
century evidence that maybe the framers of the Constitution 
wanted courts to make sure punishments prescribed by 
statute were proportional to the gravity, or difficulty of 
apprehension, or profitability, or some other relevant 
characteristic of the crime. If I found such evidence I would 
think it a valuable bone to toss to a positivist or formalist 
colleague but I would not be embarrassed by its absence 
because I would not think myself duty-bound to maintain 
consistency with past decisions.64
More recently, Judge Posner has stated that “we already have our 
own laws” and therefore do not need to examine transnational law.65
Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 425 (“In some areas, foreign and international law 
is made relevant by our Constitution, by statute or treaty, by the well-
developed principles of common law, by overwhelming considerations of 
comity, or simply by private commercial agreement of the parties. But when 
judges, on their own motion and without any direction by Congress or the 
Constitution decide to make such precedents relevant, we are dealing with an 
entirely different question.”).
63. I recognize that there are some problems with calling Judge Posner 
“conservative,” but I think it is fair to say that on most issues he is a 
conservative, legally or politically. 
64. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
13–14 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
65. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 40. 
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However, a closer reading of his argument indicates that Judge 
Posner believes transnational law should be examined,66 even though 
he believes it should not be considered any sort of “authority.”67
Tushnet argues that four current Justices have used transnational 
law in their opinions,68 and three have expressly criticized its 
usage.69  In fact, the Court is much more favorably inclined to use 
transnational law than Tushnet recognizes.  Justice Breyer is clearly 
the leading proponent of using transnational law on the Court, and he 
has referenced transnational law in many opinions,70 speeches,71 and 
66. Id. at 42 (“I do not suggest that our judges should ignore what people in 
other nations think and do. Just as our states are laboratories for social 
experiments from which other states and the federal government can learn, so 
are foreign nations laboratories from whose legal experiments we can learn.”). 
67. Id. at 41 (“A decision by a higher court in the same judicial system . . . 
is controlling. . . .  No one supposes that foreign decisions have that kind of 
authority. . . .  It is quite something else to cite a decision by a foreign or 
international court not as a precedent but merely because it contains persuasive 
reasoning (a source or informational citation), just as one might cite a treatise 
or a law review article because it was persuasive, not because it was 
considered to have any force as precedent or any authority.”).  But see David 
Fontana, Are We the World?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2004 (noting the 
relationship between Judge Posner’s writings on this issue). 
68. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245 (“Four Justices—Stevens, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer—have adverted to non-U.S. law in their opinions.”);  see 
also Jackson, Yes Please, supra note 4, at 43 (“Of the current nine justices, at 
least six—Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin 
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer—have 
done so since 1992.”).  But see id. (“It is important not to exaggerate the 
degree of controversy manifested on the Supreme Court.”).
69. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 245. 
70. E.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (citing freedom of speech decisions issued by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Knight v. 
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (analyzing decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court of 
India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Canadian Supreme Court, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee); Printz 
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (looking to 
doctrinal rules surrounding federalism in Switzerland, Germany, and the 
European Union). 
71. E.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address to the American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 2–5, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 
(2003); Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Liberty, Security and the Courts, 
Remarks at the Association of the Bar of New York (April 14, 2003), available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html.
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articles.72  Justice Ginsburg not only referenced transnational law in 
Grutter,73 but also has done so in her speeches74 and articles.75
Justice O’Connor has referenced transnational law in at least one of 
her opinions,76 and recently has given a lecture77 and written articles 
advocating reference to transnational law.78  Justice Stevens, the 
author of the majority opinion that relied on transnational law in 
Atkins,79 has used transnational law in other opinions as well.80
Likewise, Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion that 
relied on transnational law in Lawrence,81 has also referenced 
72. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among Europe’s 
Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2000) 
73. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (noting the “international understanding of the office of 
affirmative action”). 
74. E.g., Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond the 
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, Remarks to the American Constitution Society (Aug. 2, 2003), 
available at http://www.acslaw.org/video/conventionvideo.shtml. 
75. See Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, 
Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 253, 281–82 (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our 
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2004).
76. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the experiences of the 
Nuremberg Tribunals). 
77. Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks to the Southern 
Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), at http:// 
www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf.  Right before this Reply was 
to go to print, Justice O’Connor delivered a lecture on this subject at the 
Georgetown University Law Center. See O’Connor Extols Role of 
International Law (Oct. 27, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/ 
10/27/scotus.oconnor.ap. 
78. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American 
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20 (“I 
think that American judges and lawyers can benefit from broadening our 
horizons . . . . [We] will find ourselves looking more frequently to the 
decisions of other constitutional courts.”); Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See 
Joint Issues with the E.U., WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24 (quoting Justice 
O’Connor after meeting with ECJ Justices calling for more examination of 
transnational law).
79. 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002). 
80. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (looking to foreign experiences “in totalitarian regimes”). 
81. 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003). 
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transnational law in some of his other opinions.82 Justice Souter has 
also referenced transnational law in several of his opinions.83
What about the three Justices that Tushnet believes to be critics 
of the use of transnational law?84 Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted 
his strong approval of using transnational law,85 arguing that “it is 
time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of 
other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.”86
He hardly sounds like a complete cynic. 
What about Justice Scalia?  Justice Scalia has been critical of the 
use of transnational law in some of his opinions.87 In a speech in 
April of 2004 to the American Society of International Law, Justice 
Scalia maintained a generally hostile tone to the use of transnational 
82. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the “international views on detention of refugees”). 
83. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785–87 (1997) (Souter, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (examining Dutch euthanasia law). 
84. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 241–45. 
85. As Vicki Jackson recounts: 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist introduced a conference on 
comparative constitutional law in 1999 by telling the story of how, a 
decade before, the justices of Canada’s Supreme Court said to him, 
“We cite your Constitution; why don’t you cite ours?” The chief 
justice explained that at the time of that question, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was only seven years old. But time 
had passed, he said, and by 1999 it was “less defensible to say that 
we’re not familiar with it.”  “It’s time,” he wrote, that “the U.S. courts 
began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in 
their own deliberative process.” 
Jackson, Yes Please, supra note 4, at 43. 
86. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks
(1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE; A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & 
Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing decisions regarding the constitutional status of 
right to life by the West German constitutional court and the Canadian 
Supreme Court). 
87. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national 
consensus’ must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the 
views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the so-
called ‘world community.’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 
(1997) (“[C]omparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a 
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing 
one.”).
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law.88  Still, while Justice Scalia does argue that transnational legal 
materials are “hardly ever [relevant],”89 he has also argued that such 
transnational materials may be helpful in determining if “a particular 
holding will be disastrous.”90  Consequently, Justice Scalia believes 
that this usage of transnational law does not mean that such materials 
are to be used to determine the “meaning of” constitutional 
provisions.91
How does Justice Scalia’s actual practice on the bench compare 
with this jurisprudential position? Well, it seems that Justice Scalia 
uses transnational materials far more than his speech has indicated.  
In his dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma,92 Justice Scalia 
did note that transnational law could be relevant.  In Thompson, the 
Court decided that “because [the defendant] was only 15 years old at 
the time of his offense,”93 the Eighth Amendment prevented his 
execution because strong sentiments gleaned from various sources 
indicated that such an execution would be impermissible.94  Writing 
in dissent, Justice Scalia argued that: 
The practices of other nations, particularly other 
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a 
practice uniform among our people is not merely a 
historical accident, but rather so “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” that it occupies a place not merely in our 
mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well.95
In other words, Justice Scalia viewed transnational law as relevant, 
but relevant only in assessing whether a particular liberty interest fits 
within any concept of what constitutes a fundamental right. 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio 
Election Commission,96 a case in which the Court decided whether 
88. See Scalia, supra note 56.
89. Id. at 307. 
90. Id.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Reply, it is hard to see 
how—once he admits that pragmatic consequences can sometimes be 
relevant—Justice Scalia is able to say that pragmatic consequences can be 
ignored the rest of the time. 
91. Id.
92. 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 819. 
94. Id. at 822–38. 
95. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
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an Ohio state law prohibiting anonymous campaigning was 
constitutional.  As part of his analysis in the dissenting opinion, 
Justice Scalia noted that the Court had to examine whether this 
prohibition actually improved democratic elections.97  Justice Scalia 
argued that: 
We might also add to the list [of countries that have similar 
restrictions] on the other side [from the majority] the 
legislatures of foreign democracies:  Australia, Canada, and 
England, for example, all have prohibitions upon 
anonymous campaigning. How is it, one must wonder, that 
all of these elected legislators, from around the country and 
around the world, could not see what six Justices of this 
Court see so clearly that they are willing to require the 
entire Nation to act upon it:  that requiring identification of 
the source of campaign literature does not improve the 
quality of the campaign?98
Two opinions from the 2002 Term further accentuate the point 
that Justice Scalia does not believe that transnational law can never 
be used.  In Schriro v. Summerlin,99 the Court had to decide whether 
the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona,100 requiring jury 
determination of certain factors necessary for the death penalty,101
applied “retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”102 Part 
of that determination involved examining whether the rule 
announced by Ring was a “‘watershed rule[] of criminal procedure’ 
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding.”103
As part of his analysis in his majority opinion,104 Justice Scalia 
noted that: 
97. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 381–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
99. See 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004). 
100. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
101. See id. at 603–09. 
102. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521. 
103. Id. at 2524 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
104. One could therefore also argue that the use of transnational law by 
Justice Scalia was another example of the use of transnational law as part of 
the holding of a majority opinion by the Supreme Court, just as Tushnet argues 
was the case for the use of transnational law in Lawrence.  Tushnet, supra note 
6, at 241, 244. 
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[T]he mixed reception that the right to jury trial has  
been given in other countries . . . though irrelevant to the 
meaning and continued existence of that right under our 
Constitution, surely makes it implausible that judicial 
factfinding so “seriously diminishes” accuracy as to 
produce an “impermissibly large risk” of injustice.  When 
so many presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree 
over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot 
confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously
diminishes accuracy.105
105. Shriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2525.  Also examine Justice Scalia’s remarks 
during oral arguments in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), in which 
Justice Ginsburg posed a transnational law question, and Justice Scalia seemed 
to consider transnational law relevant: 
QUESTION (Justice Ginsburg): General—we’re part of a world, and 
this problem is a global problem. Other countries operating under the 
same equality norm have confronted it. Our neighbor to the north, 
Canada, has, the European Union, South Africa, and they have all 
approved this kind of, they call it positive discrimination. Do we—
they have rejected what you recited as the ills that follow from this. 
Should we shut that from our view at all or should we consider what 
judges in other places have said on this subject?
GENERAL OLSON: I submit, Justice Ginsburg that none of those 
countries has our history, none of those countries has the Fourteenth 
Amendment, none of those histories has the history of the statements 
by this Court which has examined the question over and over again 
that the ultimate damage that is done by racial preferences is such that 
if there ever is a situation in which such factors must be used that they 
must be—race neutral means must be used to accomplish those 
objective, narrow tailoring must be applied, and this—this—these 
programs fail all of those tests. 
QUESTION (Justice Scalia): General Olson, do you know whether 
any of those countries that Justice Ginsburg referred to that have gone 
down the road of racial preferences, racial entitlements, have ever 
gotten rid of racial preferences or racial entitlements? 
GENERAL OLSON: There— 
QUESTION (Justice Scalia): Has it been the road to ultimately a color 
blind society or has it been the road to a society that has percentage 
entitlements for the various races? 
GENERAL OLSON: Sadly, I believe that this is correct. 
Gratz, Record available at 2003 U.S. Trans LEXIS 27, at *23 (April 1, 2003); 
see also Tushnet, supra note 6, at 260 n.104 (quoting this exchange as well). 
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Justice Scalia also referenced foreign law in his dissent in Locke v. 
Davey106 as a way of noting the parade of horribles that might follow 
if the logic of the majority opinion was taken to its extreme.107 In 
Lawrence, he cited the Canadian experience with same-sex marriage 
in his dissent.108  While these may be examples of the “disastrous 
consequences” exception to the bar against the use of transnational 
law that Justice Scalia referenced in his speech, the other examples 
just discussed, apart from Locke and Lawrence, are clearly not. 
What do we make of these many arguments against the use of 
transnational law by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia then, 
given their strong opposition to the use of transnational law in other 
situations? It seems fair to say that Justice Scalia and other 
conservatives are not quite the critics of transnational law that 
Tushnet assumes, although Justice Clarence Thomas may very well 
be.109  There are two other related explanations, one principled and 
one unprincipled.  The unprincipled explanation, of course, is that 
Justice Scalia in McIntyre, Summerlin and Locke simply used 
transnational law because it helped his argument, and that there is no 
principled reason why he disagreed with the use of transnational law 
in Printz and Atkins.  As Justice Scalia himself notes in a previous 
essay that he wrote, “the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd 
and pick out your friends.”110
106. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
107. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s holding is limited to 
training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of 
directions to go.  What next? . . . [R]ecall that France has proposed banning 
religious attire from schools, invoking interests in secularism no less benign 
than those the Court embraces today.”). 
108. 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (“One of the benefits of leaving regulation of 
this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike 
judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion.  The people may feel 
that their disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow 
homosexual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual 
acts—and may legislate accordingly.  The Court today pretends that it 
possesses a similar freedom of action, so that we need not fear judicial 
imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a 
decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal).”). 
109. But see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (examining the experiences of Belgium, Cyprus, 
Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe). 
110. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (1997) (quoting 
Judge Harold Leventhal). 
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A more interesting and perhaps more plausible explanation is 
that Justice Scalia supports the use of transnational law but simply 
has some concerns about how it may be used in specific contexts.  
He may support the kind of analysis I mentioned in the 
introduction—the next generation analysis that seeks to devise rules 
and a system for using transnational law and the integrative 
approach—rather than considering its usage entirely unproblematic 
or problematic.  Although this Reply is not the place to fully develop 
these concerns voiced by Justice Scalia and his compatriots,111 they 
are not entirely unreasonable concerns about the use of transnational 
law in particular, nor are they, as Tushnet suggests, just debates 
about constitutional interpretation in general. 
For one thing, as Justice Scalia noted in Thompson, transnational 
law should not be used before domestic law is examined.112  In 
Thompson, Justice Scalia admitted the potential relevance of 
transnational law, but was also partly critical of its usage.113  Justice 
Scalia’s mixed feelings about the use of transnational law in 
Thompson stemmed from the fact that he seemed to believe that, for 
a liberty interest to be very important, it needed to be generally 
accepted by the American people first.  Only then could one examine 
whether it was somehow essential to any notion of liberty in the 
abstract , which is the context in which transnational law would be 
used.114 This is a debate about the usages of transnational law as an 
interpretive tool in particular—how important transnational law is 
and where it fits within the hierarchy of interpretive sources. 
Also, those who have occasionally indicated some hesitation 
about the use of transnational law are concerned that transnational 
law itself be used in a principled fashion.  In his speech to the 
American Society for International Law, Justice Scalia noted his 
concerns about when the Court used transnational law, and which 
111. I have elsewhere addressed (and I hope rebutted) at least some of these 
concerns.  David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001). 
112. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
113. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there must first be “a settled 
consensus among our own people” before “the views of other nations” may be 
imposed). 
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countries and courts it referred to when citing such law.115  As Judge 
Posner has argued, “the judicial systems of the rest of the world are 
immensely varied and most of their decisions inaccessible, as a 
practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law clerks.”116 This 
same concern was also voiced during the congressional hearings 
about the Feeney resolution117 and in Justice Scalia’s speech to the 
American Society of International Law.118
Again, this is not the debate that Tushnet is referencing:  
Tushnet references a debate about the propriety of transnational law 
ever being used, and a debate that is really just a charade, when the 
real debate is about originalism.  In contrast to this argument that the 
debate is all about originalism,119 this argument about selective use 
of transnational materials is valid, serious, and independent of 
concerns about originalism.  It is also a debate more about how using 
transnational law would work in practical operation.120
115. Scalia, supra note 56, at 309.
116. Posner, supra note 65, at 41. 
117. Ramsey testimony, supra note 61, at 1–3. 
118. Scalia, supra note 56, at 309 (noting problems with selectivity of Court 
decisions as to when they use transnational law at all and what transnational 
law they use). 
119. This is not to deny that the debate about originalism is a central part of 
the debate about transnational law.  See generally id.  There is just more to this 
debate than traditional debates about constitutional interpretation. 
120. Critics of the use of transnational law have made other objections that 
seem to be determinative (i.e. not next generation debates), but these 
objections are not ones that many take seriously.  Judge Posner, for example, 
recently commented: 
This brings me to the third problem, which is the undemocratic 
character of citing foreign decisions. Even decisions rendered by 
judges in democratic countries, or by judges from those countries who 
sit on international courts, are outside the U.S. democratic orbit. This 
point is obscured because we think of our courts as “undemocratic” 
institutions. But that is imprecise. Not only are most state judges 
elected, but federal judges are appointed and confirmed by elected 
officials, the president, and the members of the Senate. So our judges 
have a certain democratic legitimacy. But the judges of foreign 
countries, however democratic those countries may be, have no 
democratic legitimacy here. The votes of foreign electorates are not 
events in our democracy. 
Posner, supra note 65, at 42.  I address this argument in a work in progress, but 
suffice it to say, it is hard to say how these concerns are fully valid. 
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III. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AS BINDING LAW
Tushnet next turns his attention to situations in which American 
courts must use transnational law.  Tushnet believes that objections 
to these situations generally amount to a “tempest in a teapot.”121 He 
does not address whether these objections are doctrinally valid, but 
rather whether they are important as a matter of legal policy.  
Tushnet first addresses federalism concerns, which he considers to be 
unconvincing because he does not see any fundamental difference 
between a system of litigation where transnational law is addressed 
on the federal level and a system where it is addressed at other 
levels.122  Tushnet argues that these federalism concerns are really 
“conceal[ing]” more legitimate objections.123
Tushnet then turns to sovereignty-based concerns, which he 
considers unimportant because he believes that any transnational 
norms that are integrated into American law are integrated by 
American decision makers.124  This Part briefly addresses these 
points, and shows how, on both points, Tushnet understates the 
existence of valid concerns, but how there might be ways to address 
those concerns and remain in the integrated system I referenced 
earlier.  While he does consider other issues that some may have 
with the integrative project to be valid and therefore gives them 
serious attention,125 he does not consider the federalism and 
sovereignty-based issues to be valid and consequently fails to give 
them sufficient attention. 
121. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 248. 
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 249. 
125. Id. at 241 (“The important analytical concerns are not about sovereignty 
but are rather about the substance of domestic constitutional law, and about the 
separation of powers question of who gets to determine that substance.”); id. at 
257 (noting “a concern that making non-U.S. law a rule of decision would 
generate bad law”).  I found his discussion of both of these points to be quite 
convincing, but I disagree with his contention that these are the more—or 
only—legitimate objections to the integrative approach. 
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A.  Federalism 
Tushnet discusses federalism concerns by first addressing the 
debate about the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”).126  That statute 
states that federal district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”127 Some courts 
have interpreted the ATCA to create a cause of action for individuals 
to bring suit for actions that violate international law.128  Led by 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, some have argued that the 
ATCA was intended to create a cause of action for a very small 
range of problematic conduct,129 and for other cases the ATCA 
simply provides for jurisdiction, leaving the cause of action to be 
found elsewhere, most likely in state law.130
Tushnet does not address whether these arguments are 
doctrinally valid.  Rather, he questions whether it makes any 
difference if international law is understood as federal or state law.  
As he sees it, in the instance of the ATCA, “any federal court 
inclined to impose liability under the ATCA would find that the state 
courts would do so as well.”131  In other words, whether under state 
or federal law, the same set of legal actions would proceed.  Tushnet 
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see Tushnet, supra note 6, at 246–48.  
Tushnet does not see the difference between calling the statute the Alien Tort 
Claims Act or the Alien Tort Act: 
I have discovered that there is a bizarre—and to me totally pointless—
controversy over how to refer to this statute.  Apparently, human 
rights advocates call it the Alien Tort Claims Act, while their 
opponents call it the Alien Tort Act.  That people actually think 
anything turns on the label shows how odd these discussions are. 
Id., at 246 n.38.  In fact, though, calling the statute the Alien Tort Claims Act 
makes it sound like the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–
2680 (2000), a statute that clearly does create a cause of action.  So, the 
difference in phrasing is at least rhetorically—if not really doctrinally or 
prudentially—important.   
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
128. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996). 
129. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 587 (2002). 
130. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International 
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 870 (1997). 
131. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 248. 
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views the only significant difference to be that “Congress can 
displace the cause of action”132 if the cause of action is supplied by 
federal law, “while under the alternative[,] state legislatures 
could.”133
At a very general level, it is difficult to imagine that state 
legislatures and Congress (or elected state judges and Article III 
federal judges) would treat international law in precisely the same 
way as one another.  We know of some examples of state activity 
related to foreign affairs, such as the many city and state provisions 
restricting interactions with apartheid South Africa,134 the anti-
Burma law from Massachusetts that the Court recently considered,135
and the Holocaust law from California that the Court addressed last 
term.136  A state may pass a law protecting one particular industry of 
great importance to it and may hold parties liable for ATCA suits, for 
instance, while Congress would be less likely to pass such a law.137
At a practical level, this concern about whether the cause of 
action comes from federal or state law has a variety of important 
implications.  For instance, some circuit courts have attributed a ten-
year statute of limitations to non-state-law claims brought under the 
ATCA by analogizing it to a similar federal statute.138  If ATCA 
cases were litigated pursuant to state law, however, then state statutes 
of limitations would apply,139 and these would be much shorter than 
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Peter Fitzgerald, Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade 
Organization: A Commentary on Blacklisting, Federalism, and Internet 
Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (2001). 
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G–22M (1997), held unconstitutional, by 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
136. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
137. Of course, the federal government sometimes passes laws that protect a 
narrow industry as well. 
138. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. 102-256,  
§ 2(c), 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  For judicial 
decisions applying the TVPA statute of limitations to ATCA cases, see Papa v. 
United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1011–13 (9th Cir. 2002) and Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, 
at *61–*62 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002). 
139. Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *63. 
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under the current ATCA rule.140  There would also be differences in 
the amount and nature of damages available and applicable rules 
related to the exhaustion of remedies.141 So, in addition to possibly 
different instances under which cases would go forward if the 
federalism-based concerns were taken seriously, the particular nature 
of these actions would differ as well. 
Tushnet then turns to the argument that customary international 
law should not be considered part of the “Laws of the United States” 
mentioned in Article VI of the Constitution,142 but instead that 
“[c]ustomary international law is the law of New York, Iowa, and 
Texas.”143 As Tushnet sees it, this question only makes a difference 
when three conditions are met: 
(1) the judge (probably a federal judge, acting under the 
alienage, diversity, or federal question jurisdiction) would 
not find the conduct at issue to violate purely domestic law; 
(2) the judge would find the conduct to violate customary 
international law; and (3) if customary international law is 
federal law, Congress would not displace the judge’s 
holding whereas some state legislatures would.144
It is plausible that state law might not apply in some instances where 
federal law might, such as when the conduct at issue relates to 
actions that took place overseas.  Once again, in such cases state 
legislatures and Congress would certainly act differently with respect 
to international law, so Tushnet’s third condition might be met often, 
despite his assurance that “[t]he real-world cases satisfying these 
[three] conditions appear to be a nearly empty set.”145
140. Id. at *61 (discussing the significant hardships for plaintiffs in the 
“[a]pplication of the shorter statutes of limitations available under [state] 
laws”).
141. The ATCA, for example, has a provision for damages and exhaustion of 
remedies that may very well differ from state law provisions governing like 
claims.  28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a)(2) (b). 
142. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
143. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 249.  Tushnet argues that “treaties are 
supreme under the Supremacy Clause,” and that since “[i]nternational law does 
not distinguish between customary international law and treaty-based law,” 
then domestic law should not either.  Id at 248.  But this is a major logical leap, 
one that requires more elaboration than Tushnet provides. 
144. Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted). 
145. Id.
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At a broader level, Tushnet does not seem to recognize the 
important role that states play in enforcing transnational law, and 
therefore why it is important to ensure that they not be entirely 
displaced.  We want to make sure that states play an active role in 
transnational law for reasons that Tushnet ignores.  We have 
benefited substantially from the active role that states have played in 
implementing many private international law conventions146 and 
international trade agreements.147 Each state has been able to enforce 
these international rules in the best manner possible given local 
conditions, while still maintaining a degree of uniformity.  In the 
context of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), for instance, 
innovative state regulatory schemes regarding government 
procurement have been entirely displaced by new international 
regimes.148  It is this concern that caused the North Dakota Attorney 
General to remark that “‘NAFTA and other trade agreements present 
the greatest challenge to state sovereignty that we have.”149  Because 
states are closer to citizens than is the federal government, they are 
also able to enforce norms of international law in a more 
democratically legitimate manner.  Tushnet ignores these virtues 
when he argues that it is unimportant how transnational litigation 
should proceed. 
146. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 601–03 (1995) (describing structure and 
purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws).
147. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) 
(2000) (barring anyone other than the United States from challenging U.S. or 
state action or inaction based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round 
Agreements); URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H. R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 675–77, 1043–44 
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054–56, 4327. 
148. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, pt. II, Annex 4(b): Agreement on 
Government Procurement, 31 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND 25, 679–705 (1994). 
149. Evelyn Iritani, Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at A1 (quoting Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General, 
North Dakota). 
DAVID_FONTANA_PRINTREADY_032405.DOC 3/28/2005 9:50:58 AM
130 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn 
It is also important that we make sure that some uniformity 
exists in how the United States interacts with other countries.150 As it 
stands now, true international law litigation has been so 
infrequent151—and limited mostly to very severe cases152—that it has 
infringed on the prerogatives of states in only a very limited manner.  
Still, we want to devise a system that balances the need for 
uniformity with the need for maintaining a vital role for states, and 
this division should now be our focus.  Perhaps we might want to 
expand the role of state governments in national litigation involving 
the meaning of international law, much as the German Länder have a 
major role in the interactions between their national government and 
the European Union.153 Perhaps some formulations of how norms of 
international law apply to states should be given a “margin of 
appreciation,” so that each state can determine—within a range—
how to apply a particular norm.154  There are many ways we can 
address federalism concerns and still benefit from international law 
litigation in our courts; the important point is that we should start 
trying now. 
B.  Sovereignty 
Tushnet also turns to the concerns that others have that the 
integration of transnational law into domestic law may infringe on 
150. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the importance of uniformity in 
implementing national laws). 
151. See David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and Its 
Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 480 n.17 (2001) (“In an admittedly 
imperfect empirical exercise, I calculate that since 1980 there have been 
approximately ninety-five reported decisions involving a substantial issue 
implicating the ATS.”). 
152. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(allowing Argentine citizens residing in the United States to bring an action 
against a former Argentine general for torture, murder, and prolonged arbitrary 
detention). 
153. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of 
Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF 
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 242–43 
(Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001). 
154. Gerald Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony 
and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1871–72 (2003). 
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American sovereignty.155  As Tushnet sees it, these concerns are not 
as significant as others claim because: 
[D]omestic law-making institutions retain the power to 
override nearly all international obligations. They can 
withdraw from a treaty, violate a treaty for purposes of 
domestic law while accepting the consequences of the 
violation on the international level, and—most relevant to 
customary international law but applicable as well to treaty 
obligations—can enact a statute inconsistent with 
international law that, prior to the statute, was domestically 
applicable, thereby displacing the international rule with a 
domestic one under the “last in time” principle.156
In other words, since American institutions are the institutions that 
give practical effect to international rules, there are no serious 
sovereignty concerns.157
Tushnet illustrates his argument with reference to several 
specific examples.  First, he notes that in the case of the application 
of customary international law in American federal or state courts, 
“domestic law-making institutions retain the power to override 
nearly all international obligations.”158  Tushnet also references the 
WTO and the dispute resolution procedure that it uses to determine 
whether the laws of a particular nation-state violate international 
law.159  Tushnet argues that “[f]ormally speaking, the dispute 
resolution mechanism does not in itself make the WTO’s treaty 
interpretations controlling in domestic disputes.”160 Tushnet also 
makes this argument in the context of NAFTA, which provides the 
basis for free trade violation lawsuits against the United States.161
Tushnet argues that, although a finding of a NAFTA violation “is 
155. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 257, 260–67. 
156. Id. at 249–50. 
157. Id. at 253 (“It is harder than one might think to formulate the precise 
constitutional [sovereignty] objection . . . .”); id. at 255 (discussing how 
sovereignty arguments “seem to be even weaker than the federalism-based 
objections”); id. at 256 (“[T]he objections are constitutionally creative.  It is 
not that they are frivolous in some strong sense.  Instead, they are at odds with 
rather long-standing understandings of constitutional law and working them 
out in detail can create some pretty peculiar doctrinal structures.”).
158. Id. at 249. 
159. Id. at 252. 
160. Id.
161. Id. at 252–54. 
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very likely to generate a response by Congress preempting the state 
[or federal] law,”162 Congress or the relevant state legislature itself 
makes the final decision and is not obligated to enforce the decision 
issued pursuant to a finding of a NAFTA violation.163
Several issues arise from the notion that there are no problems 
with the integrative approach because American institutions retain 
ultimate control.  First of all, domestic institutions must follow an 
increasing number of transnational legal rules regardless of whether 
they have consented to implement such obligations.  These rules—
often called jus cogens or peremptory norms—are said to be binding 
regardless of what a state does.164 Thus, if a state indicates through 
its institutions that it disagrees with these transnational norms, it 
breaks the law, rather than indicating its decision to opt out of this 
law.165
In reality, these peremptory norms still apply only to a very 
small range of conduct, and it would be practically impossible for an 
American individual to be subjected to these norms in the absence of 
actions of an American institution.  Still, these norms have had some 
impact, such as in the movement to prosecute Henry Kissinger for 
crimes against humanity.166 Kissinger fled Paris to avoid being 
forced to address a warrant commanding his testimony in a French 
case.167  He did the same to avoid French and Chilean judges in 
England.168 No act of Congress, no executive order, and no federal 
regulation had functionally implemented the peremptory norms that 
162. Id. (emphasis added). 
163. Id.
164. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334, 347, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698–
99, 703; Siderman v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k & reporters’ note 6 (1987).
165. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 
n.15 (2d Cir. 1980). 
166. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2001);
Christopher Hitchens, The Case Against Henry Kissinger, HARPER’S MAG.,
Feb. 2001, http://www.icai-online.org/files/hitchens_harpers_kissinger.pdf. 
167. Christopher Hitchens, The Latest Kissinger Outrage, SLATE (Nov. 27, 
2002), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2074678. 
168. Jonathan Franklin & Duncan Campbell, Kissinger May Face 
Extradition to Chile, GUARDIAN, June 12, 2002, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/ 
international/story/0,3604,735723,00.html. 
DAVID_FONTANA_PRINTREADY_032405.DOC 3/28/2005 9:50:58 AM
Month 200x] 133
caused the lawsuits in these countries, yet Kissinger still had cause to 
be concerned. 
Of course, in most instances a domestic institution will be 
required to act to effectuate transnational law on American soil.  
Surprisingly, Tushnet, though one of the most influential anti-
formalists of the past generation, argues that the technical, formal 
control that domestic institutions maintain in creating and bringing 
into effect transnational law is sufficient to alleviate any potential 
concerns.169  However, delegating authority to transnational 
institutions might be a cause for concern in the same way that 
delegating authority to administrative institutions might. Both acts of 
delegation encourage directly accountable branches of government to 
avoid meaningful accountability by enacting vague statutes that 
enable other (domestic or international) institutions to act.  While 
American branches of government still maintain technical control 
over the implementation of international rules, allowing them to 
delegate great amounts of authority allows them to play a very 
minimal role. 
Tushnet considers the constitutional merits of this form of 
argument to be dubious,170 but surely that is an overstatement.  The 
Constitution does seem to encourage—if not require—elected 
officials to take responsibility for public policy.  The Appointments 
Clause requires the president to take responsibility for the execution 
of laws.171 The decision to grant Congress the sole power to legislate 
makes Congress accountable for legislative action.172 When 
American institutions grant transnational institutions significant 
powers, usually done through an enabling act, the American 
institutions proceed to act quite infrequently and in a perfunctory 
169. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 249, 253–57, 263. 
170. Id. at 253–54. 
171. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961).  For a discussion of this Clause in the context of international 
delegations, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural 
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563 (2003); 
Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International 
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 107–
10 (2000); John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 120–29 (1998).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
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manner to oversee and implement the actions of these transnational 
institutions. 
Any initial enabling act that provides for the relevance of 
transnational law—which Tushnet considers to be so central—can 
often be in many ways a small and meaningless legislative activity.  
In the United States, the executive branch normally must receive 
congressional assent before it can begin trade discussions, and then 
any product that results from these discussions must be submitted to 
Congress for its approval.173  However, Congress may waive its 
power to amend the submitted proposal and its power to use 
supermajority voting in the Senate.174  In the context of the WTO, 
Tushnet’s example of a harmless delegation, the United States 
negotiated and then consented to the WTO solely using the fast track 
procedure.175  Congress can either vote yes or no on a trade 
agreement using this procedure, but cannot negotiate any details of 
the agreement or even seriously debate the agreement.176
How does the WTO work in practice? In 1994, the Uruguay 
Round Agreements created a standing Appellate Body to review the 
work of the WTO.177  The General Council of WTO members can 
overrule this Appellate Body, but only by a supermajority vote or 
consensus,178 and thus a decision by the Appellate Body usually 
results in a final decision by the WTO.  In 1993, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”), acting pursuant to authority granted by 
the Clean Air Act, issued a regulation defining how dirty gasoline 
was permitted to be.179 This regulation required the domestic 
refineries only to ensure that their gasoline did not fall below the 
173. Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Addressing Environmental 
Concerns Regarding Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 221, 
229 (1995). 
174. Id. 
175. See Harold Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143, 163 (1992). 
176. Id. at 161 n.47. 
177. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uraguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, adopted Dec. 15, 1993, pt. II, Annex 2: Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, para. 17.1, 33 
I.L.M. 112, 123 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
178. Id.
179. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1998) (promulgated 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8) (1994)). 
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lowest of three firm- or industry-specific baselines.180  By contrast, 
the regulation required importers of foreign gasoline to follow a 
more demanding standard.181  Venezuela objected to the EPA 
standard, and used the WTO dispute resolution procedure to 
challenge this standard.182  The WTO Appellate Body agreed with 
Venezuela that the EPA regulation was not justifiable under Article 
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.183
Following Tushnet’s theory, there should be no policy concerns 
with this WTO ruling because an American institution would have to 
decide whether to enforce this WTO ruling; otherwise, it would just 
be words on paper, with no practical significance.  However, the 
WTO gained its initial authority to decide the Venezuela case 
because the American government had consented to an agreement 
prohibiting the very vague act of “unjustifiable discrimination.”184
This is hardly an example of a directly accountable democratic 
branch deliberating and clearly deciding upon the proper course of 
policy and legal standard. 
Furthermore, American institutions did have to consider the 
WTO ruling in order to make it effective, and this particular WTO 
decision generated as much rhetoric as almost any decision by a non-
American tribunal.  The discussion of this issue, however, was 
comparatively brief, and many of the technical and other details were 
settled by the WTO decision.  The American government acted, but 
with background facts already established.  As Justice White noted in 
his dissent in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,185
administrative agencies make the overwhelming amount of federal 
administrative law, and when Congress acts with respect to an 
administrative activity, it acts with many of the facts and context 
180. Id. § 80.91(a). 
181. Id. § 80.91(b)(4). 
182. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNITED STATES—STANDARDS FOR 
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL GASOLINE: REPORT OF THE PANEL, NO.
WT/DS2R (1996). 
183. WORLD TRADE ORG., UNITED STATES—STANDARDS FOR 
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL GASOLINE: REPORT OF THE APPELLATE 
BODY, NO. AB-1996-1, AT 29 (1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603, 633. 
184. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XX, 61 
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
185. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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already established by the administrative agencies.186 Of course, 
administrative agencies can often act with direct effects on American 
citizens, while international institutions cannot, but in both cases if 
Congress does act, it only need act in a very brief and incomplete 
fashion.
What should we make of these transnational institutions to 
which Tushnet has no problems granting power?  We might have 
less of a problem with their authority if they were themselves 
democratic, but, in fact, international bodies tend to make rules 
according to the wishes of the executive branches of member states. 
International institutions are at least as likely as domestic regulatory 
institutions to be subject to regulatory capture by a few powerful 
interests.  Domestic regulatory agencies also exercise substantial 
authority and, as an empirical matter, cause popularly elected 
branches of government to make fewer important decisions.  Besides 
the fact that they are still more likely to be democratically 
accountable via the Appointments Power or mere geographical and 
social proximity to democratic interests, though, there are cultural 
differences between the two situations.  Individuals exercising 
authority in transnational institutions come from different 
backgrounds, and have a different set of cultural norms and 
assumptions, for example, than do American officials.  So, to go 
back to a debate that Professor Tushnet himself quotes in his 
piece,187 someone from Chile will have a different cultural frame of 
reference than someone from Alabama.  In a world in which, as a 
practical matter, that individual from Chile will be exercising a 
substantial degree of daily power even if an American institution has 
the ultimate, formal power over that individual, this might be of 
concern.
Still, despite the fact that these sovereignty concerns have 
substantial validity, this does not mean that it is time to abandon the 
integrative project.  Delegating some authority to international 
institutions can reduce the costs of making decisions because these 
186. Id. at 985–86. 
187. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 267 n.130 (quoting an e-mail from me stating 
that “a New Yorker might have problems with someone from Connecticut 
telling them or her what to do, but would have more difficulty with someone 
from Alabama doing so, and even more difficulty with someone from Chile 
doing so.”) 
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institutions have some institutional advantages over American 
legislatures.  Not surprisingly, then, the open markets created by 
institutions like the WTO have been responsible for substantial 
amounts of economic growth.  The human rights litigation that has 
gone forward because of the recognition of certain fundamental 
norms has been at least partly responsible for disposing brutal leaders 
such as Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor.188  There are clear 
benefits to recognizing strong rules of international law that states 
generally cannot avoid. 
However, if we are going to follow this system, it is time to 
focus on how to make these transnational institutions more 
democratically accountable to American and other citizenries—both 
internally and externally—so as to avoid any concerns that these 
institutions might go forward with very little consent from domestic 
populations.  Perhaps we should seriously reconsider rules that force 
Congress to lay down stronger “intelligible principle[s]”189 when it 
makes international agreements, or that force Congress to seriously 
and soberly consider a transnational ruling before it gives such a 
ruling domestic effect.190
Perhaps Congress should exercise some version of its 
Appointment Power when important officials are being considered 
for high-level positions in international organizations.  As an 
example, consider the variation in the procedure used to select 
adjudicative panels in WTO disputes versus NAFTA disputes.  In the 
WTO, panelists are chosen by the WTO itself, and no member state 
can oppose their selection except for “compelling reasons.”191 For 
188. See generally Aryeh Neier, Accountability for State Crimes: The Past 
Twenty Years and the Next Twenty Years, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 351 
(2003). 
189. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928) (setting an “intelligible principle” as the litmus test for a congressional 
delegation’s constitutionality). But see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388, 430 (1935) (representing one of the two instances in which the Court has 
found the “intelligible principle” lacking) (internal citation omitted); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) 
(representing the other instance). 
190. See, e.g., S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Dole proposed the creation 
of a domestic appellate body that would consider WTO rulings before they 
could become domestically effective. 
191. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 8.6, 33 I.L.M. at 
119. 
DAVID_FONTANA_PRINTREADY_032405.DOC 3/28/2005 9:50:58 AM
138 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:nnn 
NAFTA adjudications, however, the parties themselves select the 
panelists, and if they cannot agree on such panelists they choose 
panel members by lottery.192
We might also begin to consider means of opening up 
international institutions to participation by American citizens.  Right 
now, dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO are closed to the 
public,193 information about the members of the adjudicatory panels 
are secret,194 and NGOs and other institutions and individuals may 
not observe sessions of the legislative body of the WTO.195  Again, 
changing these rules might be a way of opening up these 
international institutions to public input, which would be a way of 
remedying any sovereignty concerns. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The globalization of American law is an inevitable by-product 
of the way our world is changing.  In Canada, for instance, in nearly 
half of all cases decided between 1984 and 1995, judges cited to a 
foreign case, and in one out of three cases, judges cited to an 
American case.196  Closer to home, our judges regularly use their 
summer vacations to meet with foreign judges and discuss shared 
legal issues, and during the year they meet at law schools such as 
Yale and New York University.197  It seems that it is just a matter of 
time before our law becomes significantly more globalized. 
192. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2011.1, 107 
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289. 
193. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 177, art. 14, 33 
I.L.M. at 122. 
194. Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in 
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 331, 333 n.15 
(1996) (“Unfortunately, the biographies of trade dispute panelists . . . are 
unavailable.”). 
195. See id. at 334. 
196. C.L. Ostberg et al., Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: 
Explaining the Citations of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 34 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 377, 386 (2001). 
197. For a recent example of the books that Yale Global Constitutionalism 
Seminar for Judges creates, see PAUL GEWIRTZ, GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: TERRORISM: DETENTION, JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES;
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; COMMERCIAL SPEECH, INTERNET JURISDICTION;
THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (2003). 
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This is certainly a good thing.  As we learn more about how 
other countries handle situations, it will expand the range of 
possibilities we consider in our law.  It will increase our 
understanding of these countries and hence improve our relationships 
with them.  Moreover, entering into joint agreements with these 
countries has proven to increase cooperation, comity, and as a result, 
economic growth and protection of human rights. 
Despite these virtues and Tushnet’s defense of parts of the 
system that have led to these virtues, we should not delude ourselves 
into thinking that these arrangements do not have their own unique 
and substantial problems.  The solution is not to give up on the 
globalization project; rather, it is time for us to stop debating the 
merits of this project and to think about how to make it work best.  
Now is the time to start with this project.
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